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The law and policy frameworks for allocation or  
reallocation of water to different uses, or within a 
category of use, remain underdeveloped in India. This 
paper intends providing a starting point for a 
conversation on the law and policy dimensions of 
inter-sectoral water allocation. Focusing on a specific 
inter-sectoral water allocation conflict in Rajsamand 
District, Rajasthan, it illustrates gaps in the existing law 
and policy frameworks and highlights multiple issues 
that need to be addressed. It argues that the law must go 
beyond just prioritising water uses and water allocation 
to understand the issue in a comprehensive manner.
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Water allocation has been a worrying concern for the past couple of decades alongside focusing on ways to address water scarcity (Meinzen-Dick and Men-
doza 1996). Indeed, the availability of water has become an 
increasingly serious issue, in particular in drier parts of the 
country such as Western Rajasthan. Yet, physical availability is 
one of various issues that must be considered in allocating wa-
ter because scarcity is as much a social or an economic issue as 
a question of limited physical availability (UN Water 2007). 
This makes apportioning or distributing water among different 
users of a water source a complex issue. 
The allocation of a fi nite quantity of water among different 
uses is often referred to as inter-sectoral allocation of water. 
This refers to the allocation of water, which was previously 
unused, for a new use (such as a new industrial unit), as well 
as the reallocation of water, which was previously allocated 
for another use (such as from irrigation to drinking water). 
This apportioning or distributing often does not take environ-
mental aspects into consideration, such as environmental 
fl ows and the need of water for other living beings. 
Water allocation is not a new issue, but the debate has been 
largely led by economists in the context of an overall push 
for allocation to be undertaken through markets rather than 
the government (Meinzen-Dick and Appasamy 2002). Inter-
sectoral allocation of water has not been explored in detail 
from a law and policy perspective. This is partly due to that 
laws concerning the water sector tend to adopt a piecemeal 
and sectoral approach. 
Water scarcity and the absence of mechanisms to ensure 
that its different uses are considered in view of its overall 
availability exacerbate inter-sectoral water allocation con-
fl icts. Such confl icts may arise in different contexts and due to 
different reasons. Confl icts between different users of a single 
source of water, such as for drinking water, irrigation, and 
 industrial use, is one example. This is the situation in the case 
study on Lake Rajsamand in Rajasthan, which is presented in 
Section 2. Confl icts may arise over the quality of water, for 
example, where pollution of surface water by upstream users 
has adverse effects on downstream users, or where industrial 
activity pollutes groundwater sources that are used for drink-
ing water. Inter-sectoral confl icts may also arise due to the 
reallocation of water, for example, when use of water for irri-
gation, domestic supply, or fi shing is allocated to industrial 
uses (Das and Pangare 2006). These categories are not exclu-
sive and many confl icts involve an overlap.1 As in the case of 
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allocation, the legal aspects of water-use confl icts have not 
been given much attention in the literature, except in the case 
of interstate river water confl icts and international water 
confl icts (Nariman 2009; Iyer 2002).
Inter-sectoral water confl icts are not uncommon in Rajasthan 
and in many other parts of the country. We aim to initiate a 
discussion on inter-sectoral allocation of water and ensuing 
confl icts from a law and policy perspective. The paper proposes a 
new conceptual framework for inter-sectoral water allocation 
based on existing legal principles. It argues that it is imperative 
for water law and policy to recognise the links between different 
water uses and different waterbodies. In view of the lack of 
literature on the subject, we rely on a case study of an inter-
sectoral dispute over the water in Lake Rajsamand in Rajasthan, 
which reached the Supreme Court of India, to illustrate the 
limits of the existing law and policy framework on inter-sectoral 
allocation of water and related confl icts. 
1 Fragmented Law and Policy Framework
This section examines water-related laws in Rajasthan from 
the point of view of inter-sectoral water allocation. Two main 
fi ndings arise from this analysis. First, water law in Rajasthan, 
as in other states of India, is fragmented. Second, there is no 
legal framework for inter-sectoral water allocation and con-
fl icts. In the absence of a specifi c legal framework, this section 
examines the policy framework and judicial responses that 
have attempted to fi ll the gaps in the law. 
(A) Sectoral Nature of Water Laws 
The bulk of water law in Rajasthan is made of sectoral laws 
addressing different uses and sources of water. In the case of 
irrigation, there are a number of relevant laws. These include 
the Rajasthan Irrigation and Drainage Act, 1954 and the 
Rajasthan Minor Irrigation Works Act, 1953 centred on the 
state being the key actor in the development and management 
of its irrigation potential. The Rajasthan Farmers’ Participation 
in Management of Irrigation Systems Act, 2000 provides for 
constituting a water users’ association for every water user 
area. The Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 assigns the 
responsibility of irrigation works of different sizes to gram 
panchayats (village level), panchayat samitis (block level), 
and zilla parishads (district level). 
Some sectors do not benefi t from much legal guidance. For 
example, there is no specifi c state law on drinking water. The 
existing framework is limited to local laws that vest powers 
and functions relating to drinking water supply with local 
government bodies (panchayats in rural areas and municipal 
authorities in urban areas) and the Public Health Engineering 
Department (PHED) (Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994; 
Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009). 
Further, sectoral rules do not necessarily apply throughout a 
sector. This is because there are different rules governing access 
to and control over surface water and groundwater. Surface 
water resources are regulated by different legal rules, with the 
state having statutory power to control all fl owing water under 
the irrigation laws. In the case of groundwater, access is governed 
by old rules developed in the 19th century that give landowners 
virtually all control over groundwater. This dichotomy between 
groundwater and surface water confi rms the fragmented nature 
of water laws and the diffi culty of providing a framework for 
water allocation, in general, and inter-sectoral water allocation, 
in particular, in a systematic manner. 
The state government has been working for the past few 
years to adopt water laws that are not limited to sectoral con-
cerns and issues. This includes the preparation of the Draft 
Rajasthan Water Resources Management Act, 2012. More 
recently, the government has adopted the Rajasthan River Basin 
and Water Resources Planning Act, 2015 that establishes the 
River Basin and Water Resources Planning Authority, which will 
be responsible, among others, for the planning of all water-
shed, irrigation and drinking water projects. 
Despite these recent efforts, water law in Rajasthan is 
characterised by the absence of a set of principles guiding 
all uses of all water sources, while no law considers links 
between different sectors and uses. This explains in part why 
the policy framework, although non-binding, has become, in 
practice, more important than water law since it provides 
guidance for administrators to take decisions in specifi c cases. 
(B) Policy Framework: A First Step towards Prioritisation? 
The absence of a legal framework for inter-sectoral water allo-
cation has created a vacuum, which has been partly fi lled by the 
executive through policies. The Rajasthan State Water Policy 
(SWP) 2010 provides, for instance, for “judicious and economi-
cally sound allocation of water resources to different sectors, 
with drinking water supply as a fi rst priority” (para 1.1.1). The 
remaining order of priorities for allocating water resources 
and planning purposes is human drinking water followed by 
livestock drinking water, other domestic, commercial and 
municipal water uses, agriculture, power generation, environ-
mental, and ecological, industrial, non-consumptive uses and 
others. The SWP (para 1.2.3) also mandates including a drink-
ing water component in all existing and future irrigation and 
multipurpose projects where there is no dependable alterna-
tive source of drinking water, and adopting a policy of con-
junctive use of water. 
This prioritisation of the uses of water is a useful guide but 
insuffi cient since the SWP is neither binding on decision-mak-
ing authorities nor justiciable. In more practical terms, this 
means that the Water Resources Department (WRD) can 
change the order of priority after obtaining cabinet approval, 
citing exceptional circumstances (GoR 2010). Further, the 
prioritisation of drinking water on an ad hoc basis through 
executive orders is not an alternative to prioritisation as a le-
gal norm framed in water laws. 
The limitations of attempting to provide a framework for 
prioritisation of water uses for inter-sectoral allocation through 
policies have already been illustrated by developments at the 
national level. The National Water Policy, 2002 included, for 
instance, a water allocation provision that prioritised drinking 
water over irrigation and other uses. The National Water Policy, 
2012 has, however, done away with this provision. The only 
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remnants of prioritisation are found in a clause stating that 
the “principle of equity and social justice must inform use and 
allocation of water.” In addition, the new policy recognises 
that drinking water and sanitation are “pre-emptive needs” 
followed by other priority allocation such as for basic domestic 
needs and subsistence agriculture. Beyond this, it only 
provides that inter-sectoral allocation should be done in a 
manner that promotes “conservation and effi cient use.” This 
constitutes an unwelcome dilution of the earlier framework 
and confi rms the undesirability of relying on policies for 
long-term solutions instead of developing an inter-sectoral 
water allocation framework. Indeed, the government can 
at any time, and without reference to any particular frame-
work or procedure, amend, change and/or rewrite policies 
without consulting the elected representatives of the people 
(Cullet 2012). Policies are thus a possible starting point for 
an allocation framework, but they remain rudimentary as a 
regulatory tool.
(C) Judicial Contribution—Filling Gaps Sporadically
As mentioned, the water law in Rajasthan do not provide the 
basis for inter-sectoral allocation. Nevertheless, the higher 
judiciary has dealt with issues relating to water allocation and 
related confl icts on various occasions. In the absence of a guid-
ing legal framework, it has adjudicated confl icts on the basis of 
claims made by the parties to the dispute and this does not 
provide an appropriate starting point for the elaboration of 
universally applicable principles.
It is nevertheless important to understand how courts have 
understood inter-sectoral allocation and what rules and prin-
ciples have been applied to resolve confl icts. An example is 
Abdul Rehman vs State of Rajasthan (2004) where it was argued 
that protection of tanks and ponds was necessary to enjoy a 
“quality life” as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitu-
tion. One of the issues taken up by the Rajasthan High Court 
was the link between different water uses and the way in 
which allocation of water for irrigation and drinking water 
can be affected by the construction of structures such as ani-
cuts, check dams and water-harvesting structures. The court’s 
decision relied on the fi ndings of an expert committee consti-
tuted on its directions. This committee inspected various 
lakes, including Lake Rajsamand, and observed that anicuts 
were a major factor affecting water fl ows. It recommended 
that the height of anicuts be restricted to 2 metres and higher 
ones be dismantled (para 15). In its decision, the high court 
directed the state government to consider the report and rec-
ommendations of the expert committee, and to prepare a plan 
to take effective steps to restore the catchment areas to their 
original shape (para 16). 
Another example is Suo Motu vs State of Rajasthan (SB Civil 
Writ Petition No 11153/2011, order of 29 May 2012), where the 
high court took suo motu cognisance of newspaper reports on 
the “premature death” of the Ramgarh Dam in Jaipur District 
“on account of large-scale inaction on the part of the state 
government coupled with illegal acts of others.”2 It observed 
that water fl ows to the dam were obstructed by the excessive 
construction of anicuts and directed the government to prevent 
the construction of anicuts higher than 2 metres. The court, 
however, recognised the need for anicuts with a height of more 
than 2 metres in exceptional cases, but made the permission of 
the WRD mandatory in such cases (para 25).
In these two cases, the high court focused on a specifi c issue 
concerning inter-sectoral water allocation, that is, river fl ows 
in the context of insuffi cient availability of water in reservoirs. 
This is relevant and interesting, but fails to consider several 
other issues and thus remains restricted in scope, as shown in 
Section 3.
2 Water-Use Conflicts in Rajsamand—
Key Issues and Implications
The law and policy aspects of water-use confl icts related to 
allocation cannot be analysed without reference to specifi c 
case studies because of the lack of literature on the subject. 
Lake Rajsamand is an apt example because it demonstrates the 
various dimensions and kinds of water-use confl icts, such as 
inter-sectoral, intra-sectoral and inter-basin. This section focuses 
on a specifi c legal dispute and analyses its various dimensions, 
whether addressed in formal legal proceedings or not.
(A) Lake Rajsamand: Microcosm of Multiple 
Water Conflicts 
Lake Rajsamand, formed in 1676 by building a dam across the 
Gomati River during the reign of Maharana Raj Singh (Rathore 
2011), is a signifi cant source of freshwater in the district. It is 
approximately 6 kilometres long, 2.5 km wide and 18 m deep 
with a catchment area of around 510 square km. Drinking wa-
ter, irrigation and industrial use are the major uses of the lake 
water. The lake was originally intended to receive water from 
the Gomati River but two more sources were added later to 
provide more water—the Nandsamand Dam built in 1957 
across the Banas River and the Chikalwas Dam built in 1997 
on the Khari River.
The irrigation department is in charge of the maintenance 
of the lake. However, the power to allocate water for different 
uses is exercised by the District Water Distribution Committee 
(DWDC), headed by the district collector with representatives 
of different sectoral agencies, including the irrigation depart-
ment and the PHED (GoR 2005).
The lake is the major source of drinking water to Rajsamand 
town. There are a total of 6,672 water connections, of which 
6,215 are domestic (GoR 2008: 4). The PHED buys water from 
the irrigation department to supply drinking water to the 
town. Irrigation is another key use, through two canals. The 
right canal has around 6,000 hectares of irrigable land, which 
requires around 43 cubic feet per second (cusecs) of water, 
and the left canal has around 22,000 hectares of irrigable 
land with a requirement of 140 cusecs. The third important 
user of the lake is JK Industries, Kankroli, which is entitled to 
a regular supply of 41 million cubic feet (MCFT) of water per 
annum (7,00,000 gallons per day) for 20 years through an 
agreement with the state government (Agreement 2006). The 
agreement also allows JK Industries to lift water from the 
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dead storage when live storage capacity is not available. Thus, 
it is the only user that has a right to a fi xed quantity of the 
lake water. 
Confl icts over the Use of Lake Rajsamand: A confl ict among 
users of the lake water developed progressively. This was pri-
marily due to inadequate supply to meet the needs of all users, 
which culminated in the lake drying up in the early 2000s. 
The water scarcity was such that there were occasions during 
the dry season when water was taken through tube wells and 
open wells from the bed of the dried lake to meet drinking 
water requirements (GoR 2008: 4). In meetings, farmers in the 
command area of the canals complained that they had not re-
ceived water for a number of years, barring a few years.3
The priority of the right of JK Industries over all other users 
was also a matter of concern. Though this right is subject to 
the condition that suffi cient water should be reserved for 
meeting drinking water needs, it does not appear to have been 
fulfi lled all the time. It was alleged by some of our interviewees 
that while Rajsamand District faced a drought for fi ve years, 
the district administration supplied water from the lake to JK 
Industries regularly, including by boring the dried bed.4
Physical water scarcity in the early 2000s led to responses 
and protests by mainly urban drinking water users of the lake 
(NAAUSS 2006: para 11). The Lok Adhikar Manch (LAM), a non-
governmental organisation based in Rajsamand, initiated the 
Rajsamand Jheel Bharo Abhiyan (Fill Lake Rajsamand Cam-
paign). Users of the lake also demanded the supply of water 
from the Nandsamand and the Chikalwas Dams to address the 
issue of scarcity.
In 2006, the scenario changed when the lake fi lled up to the 
level of 19 feet (5.79 metres) due to good rainfall. The DWDC 
decided on 26 October 2006 to allocate up to 5 feet (1.52 metres) 
of water for irrigation. This decision triggered a confl ict 
between urban drinking water use and irrigation. Residents 
of Rajsamand town felt that the DWDC decision would affect 
their drinking water needs. It was argued that water below 
the fi ve footmark could not be used because of slurry and 
mud and that the release of water for irrigation would result 
in a water crisis for the town.5 On 28–29 October 2006, a 
bandh was called for in Rajsamand by the Rajsamand Jheel 
Jal Samrakshan Manch to protest against the DWDC’s decision. 
Nevertheless, the DWDC maintained that water for irrigation 
was allocated after reserving suffi cient water for drinking 
purposes, and that the decision was necessary to protect the 
interests of farmers. 
The Court as the Ultimate Arbiter: In the aftermath of the 
DWDC’s decision, the LAM fi led a public interest litigation (PIL) 
before the High Court of Rajasthan, challenging it primarily 
on the need to secure water in the lake for drinking water use. 
It sought a direction to maintain a minimum water level as a 
reserve to ensure there was enough water for drinking and 
other domestic purposes. The petition also sought directions 
to regulate the use of water for agricultural or commercial 
uses and for enhancing the water level by transferring water 
from the Chikalwas and Nandsamand Dams. Further, it 
brought the issue of obstructions, including anicuts in the 
catchment area, which blocked the fl ow of water to the lake, 
before the court.
It took the high court four years to dispose of the matter. In 
its decision of 2 December 2010, the court ordered that at least 
600 MCFT of water (approximately 7 feet) should be available 
in the lake “as far as possible” (NAAUSS 2010). This can be com-
pared to the court’s order of 10 November 2006 where it had 
stated that 9 feet should be kept for the purpose of drinking/
domestic needs of Rajsamand town (NAAUSS 2006a). The 
court also directed the state government to take steps to 
 increase the water level in the lake by diverting water from 
the Chikalwas and Nandsamand Dams. On obstruction to 
the fl ow of water to the lake, it ordered that the fl ow should 
be canalised. 
The LAM felt aggrieved by the decision of the high court, 
in particular the dilution of the order of 2006. As a result, it 
approached the Supreme Court. In 2012, the Supreme Court 
upheld the order of the high court (NAAUSS 2012). 
The Lake Rajsamand decision presents interesting lessons in 
inter-sectoral water allocation and confl icts. First, the high 
court applied, in effect, the principle of priority to drinking 
water by directing the state government to maintain a mini-
mum level of water in the lake. The high court did not, how-
ever, refer to the fundamental human right to water, which 
has long been held to be a part of the right to life guaranteed 
under the Constitution (Subhash Kumar 1991). 
Second, the court failed to engage effectively with the issue 
of inter-sectoral water allocation and related confl icts. It did 
not discuss any general principles that could be applied in the 
case of water use and allocation confl icts. The approach was 
narrow in its understanding of inter-sectoral water allocation 
and confl icts. The court looked at, and decided, only one aspect 
of the confl ict and overlooked other dimensions. 
Thus, the court did not address the issue of the protecting 
the catchment area of the lake comprehensively despite con-
sidering the obstruction of the fl ow of water to the lake by 
mining activities and dumping of wastes. Its response was 
limited to directing the state government to take steps to prevent 
the obstruction of water. 
(B) Other Dimensions of the Conflict
The confl ict adjudicated by the high court was conceived in the 
limited context of the claims made by the parties and addi-
tional representations by some other affected parties. This did 
not constitute a comprehensive mapping of the nature of the 
confl ict and its broader ramifi cations. Several other issues 
should have been considered if the confl ict was to be under-
stood and resolved in a comprehensive manner.
Beyond Natural Catchment: An important dimension of 
the confl ict over Lake Rajsamand is that it extends beyond its 
natural catchment. This is because a canal was built from the 
Nandsamand Dam to Lake Rajsamand to transfer water in 
times of drought. As such, the Nandsamand Dam was built on 
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the Banas River and supplies water for irrigation to farmers in 
its command area and is the major source of drinking water for 
Nathdwara town. 
Any water allocation from Lake Rajsamand may thus affect 
benefi ciaries of the Nandsamand Dam if water is diverted to 
the Gomati River basin. This was understood by water users in 
the command area of the dam who raised objections to trans-
ferring water to Lake Rajsamand. Residents of Nathdwara 
town intervened in the court case because they feared that 
their entitlement to drinking water would be affected by such 
a transfer (NAAUSS 2006b). 
The court’s decision did “use” the inter-basin dimension of 
the confl ict in its directions since it requested the government 
to take steps to transfer water from the Nandsamand and 
Chikalwas Dams to Lake Rajsamand. However, it did not con-
sider the impact of this transfer on uses of water from the 
Nandsamand Dam. It seems to have simply assumed that there 
was enough water in the Nandsamand and Chikalwas Dams. 
This is, however, an inappropriate basis for decision-making. 
Indeed, the Banas River that used to be a perennial river a few 
decades ago now fl ows only for three to four months a year 
downstream of the Nandsamand Dam.6 This has serious 
 effects on people who rely on the river for their consumptive or 
non-consumptive water uses, and has even more of a serious 
effect on the river’s ecology. The court failed to consider these 
issues and seems, in effect, to have triggered a confl ict 
 between users of different water sources in the name of resolv-
ing an inter-sectoral water-use confl ict. Visits to the command 
area of the Chikalwas Dam and areas close to the Banas River 
indicated that people understand that each cumulative inter-
vention is problematic and that broader solutions are neces-
sary. There is a need to take these additional issues into con-
sideration if judicial decisions, such as the one concerning 
Lake Rajsamand, are to be considered legitimate by all parties, 
in addition to being appropriate from an environmental fl ow 
perspective.
Mining and Water Flows: Another dimen-
sion of the confl ict that was not given enough 
visibility in the judicial proceedings is the im-
pact of activities that reduce water fl ows into 
Lake Rajsamand. Marble mining is one of the 
economic mainstays of the district that gener-
ated a revenue of Rs 877 crore in 2012–13. 
There are an estimated 421 mines in the catch-
ment area of the Gomati River (NAAUSS 
2006a). The main problems associated with 
mineral mining are dumping of marble wastes 
into the river, which has reduced its depth sig-
nifi cantly, and mine pits in the catchment 
area, which prevent rainwater from fl owing 
into the lake. These pits get fi lled during the 
monsoon and this water is used by mining in-
dustries (Sebastian 2005), exacerbating the 
water crisis and confl icts in Rajsamand. 
This problem was noted by the expert com-
mittee constituted as per the direction of the 
high court in the Abdul Rehman case. It observed that big 
fl awed marble stones and marble slurry are obstruct the fl ow 
of water to the lake from the Gomati River (Agrawal 2012). 
This was confi rmed by the high court in the Lake Rajsamand 
case (order of 10 November 2006). It found that fl ows of water 
were obstructed by mining activity, leading it to direct that 
“the fl ow of water shall be canalised. Efforts will be made to 
canalise the fl ow of water by constructing proper canals to 
take it to the Rajsamand lake.”
The response of the court to mining was appropriate in the 
limited context of water fl ows. At the same time, it did not en-
gage with the basic confl ict between industrial activities that 
affect water fl ows and water supply and water law. Making the 
link would not have required developing an entirely new area 
of regulation. There already exists a regulatory framework on 
marble mining that can contributes signifi cantly to minimis-
ing its adverse implications, including effects on the catch-
ment area of Lake Rajsamand, namely, the Rajasthan Minor 
Mineral Concession Rules, 1986 (the Rules) framed under the 
Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957. 
The Rules permit the government to adopt special procedures 
for leasing out certain minerals (Rule 65A), as was done for 
marble mining through the adoption of the Marble Policy, 2002. 
This provides that the Department of Mines and Geology can 
include certain conditions in a licence in the interests of the 
environment, fl ora and fauna (GoR 2002). The licence holder 
has a duty to dump waste in prescribed sites, to reclaim the 
mining area at their own cost, and to plant trees. Non-compliance 
can lead to cancellation of the licence (GoR 2002: Rule 9). 
The Marble Policy, 2002 also prescribes that there should 
be a mining plan where the area of the lease is more than 
4 hectares. It does not elaborate on the details of the mining 
plan, but the Rules specify that it must include a precise map 
showing all environmental amenities and an assessment of 
the effect of mining activities on them (Rule 37E). It is manda-
tory for the licence holder to carry out mining operations in 
Figure 1: Inter-basin Aspects
Lake Rajsamand and Environs
Adapted from Counter Affidavit filed on behalf of the Respondents, Special Leave Petition (Civil) No 832 of 2012 
(filed on 9 March 2012).
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accordance with the mining plan, and a violation can lead to 
suspension of operations. The Rules further specifi cally include 
measures to be undertaken by the licence holder to protect 
water resources in the mining area, including the duty to ensure 
that no natural watercourses and/or water resources are 
obstructed due to the mining operation and the duty to take 
adequate measures for the protection of older streams emanating/
passing through the area (Rule 37T).
This brief exposition confi rms that there is a framework for 
addressing the effects of mining on water in Rajasthan that 
could have been applied here. The real issue is ensuring that 
the different confl icts that intersect are identifi ed as being 
linked, and adjudicated as such. 
Statewide Anicut Regulation and Its Implications for Water 
Allocation in Rajsamand: A third dimension of the confl ict is 
that water availability in one area is affected by inter-sectoral 
water allocation decisions taken in other parts of the state. 
Here too, Lake Rajsamand is an example of the kind of prob-
lems that will increasingly surface if inter-sectoral allocation is 
not conceived in broader terms in a consistent manner. 
Lake Rajsamand on the Gomati River is a part of the Banas 
River basin that provides water to the Bisalpur Dam located 
some 200 km downstream. The Bisalpur Dam is used in part to 
provide better water supply services to Jaipur city and other 
neighbouring districts. An informal prioritisation of water 
needs in favour of the residents of the capital city was made 
and this led the state government to take measures such as 
banning the construction of anicuts in excess of 2 metres 
height throughout the catchment area. 
Farmers in Rajsamand District stated that the decision of the 
state government to ban anicuts higher than 2 metres had af-
fected them. They highlighted that the prohibition/regulation 
of construction of anicuts affected the availability of water for 
irrigation. This is crucial for farmers who depend on ground-
water because groundwater replenishment is a key  reason for 
constructing anicuts and check dams.
This highlights the link between water-use confl icts in 
Rajsamand and water use allocation and priority decisions 
made at the state level. A water allocation scheme must thus 
consider both surface water sources and groundwater as 
well as a variety of factors, from the local level to state-level 
policy decisions. 
3 Strengthening the Legal Framework 
for Inter-Sectoral Allocation
The analysis of developments in Rajsamand confi rms that the 
current law and policy framework for inter-sectoral allocation of 
water is both underdeveloped and inappropriate. This is partly 
because policymakers and lawyers have failed to effectively 
move beyond sectoral and use-specifi c views of  water. These 
views were never appropriate, and it is imperative to recon-
sider this in a context of increasing competition over available 
water, increasing uses of water and limited overall availability. 
Inter-sectoral allocation of water is organised largely 
around economic principles. In the context of water sector 
reforms introduced over the past two decades, this has meant 
that allocation or reallocation is increasingly based on 
considerations of effi ciency with equity, other factors being 
considered secondary (Dinar et al 1997). This does not neces-
sarily ensure that any given allocation benefi ts the most 
marginalised fi rst, and that it benefi ts everyone equally and is 
environment friendly. 
Where confl icts over a given allocation arise, they are some-
times adjudicated through administrative confl ict resolution 
mechanisms. The basis for the decision are the claims made by 
the parties to the dispute. This is in a sense appropriate since 
water is eminently political and will always remain so. At the 
same time, this cannot be the only basis for adjudicating 
allocation confl icts since this gives actors with more lobbying 
capacity a disproportionate say in the decision-making. It 
gives very little or no weight to marginalised actors and the 
environment. This is also an ineffi cient way of allocating 
water since political patronage is by defi nition temporary and 
needs to be constantly renewed along with parameters that 
keep changing. 
In a limited number of cases, confl icts over allocation reach 
the courts. At that level, the existing legal framework is 
applied by courts. In the absence of appropriate guidance, ad-
judication is largely ad hoc and may not necessarily consider 
all the relevant dimensions, as happened in Rajsamand. Fur-
ther, courts are not well placed to follow up and ensure that 
the principles introduced are applied in a systemic manner. 
The decisions tend to focus on confl icts of use, which is what 
litigants bring to the court, rather than issues related to pro-
tecting the source of water.
(A) Applying Basic Legal Principles to 
Inter-Sectoral Allocation
The present situation is marked by two partly contradictory 
trends on the legal front. On the one hand, the existing legal 
framework does not include any comprehensive and struc-
tured framework for inter-sectoral allocation. On the other 
hand, the existing legal framework includes the basic princi-
ples that are necessary for establishing a balanced and fair 
 inter-sectoral allocation framework based on a paradigm cen-
tred around equity and environmental justice.
The introduction of a more visible set of legal principles for 
inter-sectoral water allocation is necessitated by that different 
decisions have effects beyond specifi c contexts. It is also 
necessary to ensure that there is overall consistency in the 
practice of the government from the local to the state level. 
This will ensure that courts do not have to step in to perform 
the government’s function of water allocation, except in the 
rarest of cases. 
Principles are needed not only to ensure that allocation 
decisions take into account a broader set of variables in the 
water sector, but also that this is done in relation to other sectors. 
For instance, in a context where irrigation is increasingly 
dependent on groundwater, the link between irrigation and 
power is becoming stronger. There have been attempts to 
regulate groundwater use for irrigation through electricity supply. 
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In Rajsamand, the separation of lines into two-phase and 
three-phase has been initiated, as done earlier in Gujarat 
(Shah and Verma 2008). The supply of the three-phase lines 
used for pumping groundwater is limited to a few hours 
everyday in an attempt to reduce groundwater draft without 
affecting household electricity use.7 This highlights the 
immediate link between the two sectors and the need to take 
all relevant sectors into consideration while making water 
allocation decisions.
Similarly, local or state-level water allocations depend on 
precipitation, itself linked to the global water cycle that is 
directly infl uenced by climate change. There are thus direct 
links between the environment and water sectors that may 
seem remote when looked at from the point of view of a single 
district but are central to realistic allocation decisions in 
the long run. More generally, this confi rms that it is not just 
water allocation that matters here but also the principle of 
environmental justice.
In more specifi c terms, the following needs to be integrated 
into water allocation. First, new bases need to be given to water 
law so that the present sectoral approach makes way for a 
more unifi ed framework. The basic problem is the sectoral and 
piecemeal manner in which water law has developed. This has 
translated into different water rights for different water uses 
(for example, irrigation and drinking water) and for different 
bodies of water (for example, surface water and groundwater). 
Further, the underlying assumptions of the legal framework 
are different for different rights, as some water rights are 
directly linked to landownership (for example, irrigation, 
groundwater) while others (for example, drinking water) 
are not (Cullet 2009). A holistic approach, which considers 
water as a single unit for use, control, and management pur-
poses, is missing in existing water laws. Adopting a frame-
work legislation is one way of addressing the problems associ-
ated with the sectoral nature of water law. Rajasthan happens 
to be the fi rst state that is considering adopting such legisla-
tion. The Draft Rajasthan Water Resources Management Act, 
2012 provides, for instance, that “all water resources in 
the state of Rajasthan shall be held in public trust by the 
state on behalf of the people and communities of the state 
of Rajasthan.” 
Second, the principles of equality and equity must form part 
of any allocation scheme. This is particularly important 
 because equity is a basic principle applicable throughout the 
legal framework whereas effi ciency is not. Thus, in the case of 
a confl ict, say between urban and rural drinking water users 
or between irrigation and environmental fl ows, the weighing 
must include reference not only to allocation between two 
sectors, but also other factors that infl uence these uses. This 
constitutes an avenue to ensure, for instance, considering the 
 increasingly debated conjunctive water use in legal terms 
(Srinivasan and Kulkarni 2014). There is a technical side to 
such issues, and also a substantive one that needs to be 
 approached in part through equity considerations. 
Third, the inter-sectoral water allocation framework has to 
decentralise the governance of water. There is a relatively 
well-defi ned legal framework for the allocation of responsi-
bilities over water at the panchayat, block, district and state 
levels. Yet, this does not include principles concerning their 
inter relationships. With water, the most obvious principle to 
adopt is that of subsidiarity. In general terms, the subsidiarity 
principle requires that decisions should be taken at the lowest 
possible administrative level while recognising that certain 
issues need to be coordinated at a higher level. The only exist-
ing proposal for regulating water in this way is found in the 
Planning Commission’s (2011a) Model Bill for the Conservation, 
Protection and Regulation of Groundwater. This is centred 
on the idea that water issues are best addressed at the local 
level but within a framework that recognises the intersection 
of local, regional and state-level water issues. While the 
Model Bill  focuses on groundwater, the same logic should 
be applied more generally to water, in general. In the Lake 
Rajsamand dispute, this would imply that decisions taken by 
the collector should effectively represent the views of all the 
affected gram sabhas rather than only groups with lobbying 
power at the district level. 
Fourth, inter-sectoral allocation must integrate basic envi-
ronmental law principles such as the prevention and precau-
tionary principles. There is nothing new here since water is 
covered in environmental statutes and the whole of environ-
mental law bears in principle on water management. The reality, 
however, is that unless one speaks of water pollution, which is 
understood as an environmental issue, other water issues are 
usually considered as being exclusively water issues and the 
link with the environment is not made. As confi rmed by our 
case study, this is inappropriate because it leads to allocation 
decisions that prioritise the short-term demands of water users 
who, in this case, were directly lobbying the collector, and 
excludes environmental considerations that are often of a 
more long-term nature. Unfortunately, the high court failed to 
consider this broader context and implications of water use, 
allocation, and confl icts in Rajsamand, thereby confi rming the 
need for more a formal imposition of the consideration of envi-
ronmental law principles on all actors involved in taking inter-
sectoral decisions.
(B) Ensuring Binding Prioritisation and 
Its Comprehensive Application
The existing framework for inter-sectoral allocation of 
water is in essence limited to the prioritisation framework 
found in national and state water policies. As discussed 
in Section 1, this does not provide a fi rm legal basis for 
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prioritising water uses because they are non-justiciable 
and can be changed at any point without reference to any 
particular procedure. 
Prioritisation of water uses is only one of the elements 
necessary for facilitating inter-sectoral allocation. It has 
already been widely debated in policy terms and gives useful 
guidance to administrators. Yet, the only clear prioritisation 
that exists in the legal framework is of drinking water over all 
other uses because it constitutes the core of the fundamental 
right to water. This priority has never been questioned. This 
was reiterated by the high court in the Lake Rajsamand case 
where it recognised the obligation of the state “to provide 
adequate drinking water facility for the entire population 
both in urban and rural areas. The need for drinking water is 
always the fi rst charge on any available water.” In general, the 
relevant agencies seem to naturally abide by this priority. This 
is exemplifi ed by the 2009 order of the WRD for fi xing use 
priorities. Through it, the state government prohibited the use 
of water in tanks, dams and anicuts for irrigation purposes due 
to a weak monsoon and scarcity of water for drinking purposes. 
The order prescribed that, barring a few tanks that received 
suffi cient infl ows, “water in all the other dams, tanks and 
anicuts is hereby  reserved for drinking purposes” (GoR 2009). 
In case water was available for irrigation, the order required 
the DWDC concerned to pass a resolution to that effect with 
prior clearance from the state government. 
Such measures may be appropriate responses in specifi c 
cases. However, prioritisation of drinking water on an ad hoc 
basis through an executive order cannot be an alternative to 
legally sanctioned prioritisation. Thus, while prioritisation is 
not denied by any actor in Rajsamand, the Lake Rajsamand 
case shows that JK Industries enjoys de facto fi rst priority on 
the lake because it is the only user that benefi ts from a special 
legal arrangement. This is problematic because, in practice, 
this priority may trump drinking water needs.
The fi rst step forward would be to include a clause in legis-
lation mirroring the prioritisation scheme in the Rajasthan 
State Water Policy, 2010. Such a proposal was fi rst made in 
two legislations drafted by the Planning Commission in 2011. 
This is also found in the Draft Rajasthan Water Resources 
Management Act, 2012, which recognises it and provides for a 
prioritisation of water in Section 25, starting with drinking 
water, water for livestock, municipal use, food security 
and ecology. This is followed by secondary uses focusing on 
irrigation, and tertiary uses including power generation, 
commercial fi sheries, industrial use, recreational use and 
other purposes.
This binding prioritisation would be an important fi rst step 
in making inter-sectoral allocation more consistent and pre-
dictable. At the same time, administrators require more than a 
linear prioritisation framework to resolve practical issues. This 
is well illustrated by the case study. What is at stake is not only 
allocation between drinking water, irrigation, industrial use 
and environmental fl ows, but also allocation between different 
and competing drinking water needs in different areas (urban 
and rural) and between different industrial needs (for example, 
the consumptive uses of JK Industries and mining activities 
affecting the catchment zone).
(C) Responding to Multi-scalar Water Conflicts in a 
Comprehensive Manner
Increasingly complex issues of inter-sectoral allocation of water 
among competing uses will arise in the future given the 
 increasing economic, social, and physical scarcity of water. 
Even if it was binding, the current prioritisation scheme would 
be insuffi cient because inter-sectoral allocation is often deter-
mined only at the specifi c level at which competing uses are 
identifi ed. This often fails to recognise the effects of decisions 
taken at one level or the other. 
The Lake Rajsamand case highlights that this “limited” 
dispute between the drinking water needs of town residents 
and farmers in the command area is actually much more com-
plex than it appears on the surface. Even the limited scope of 
the judicial proceedings could not avoid including some more 
elements than the issues originally presented to it, such as the 
claims of the residents of Nathdwara town. However, the high 
court’s decision is silent on various other factors that directly 
contribute to the confl ict, such as the signifi cant effect of mining 
in the catchment area of the lake. It is also silent on the effects 
of water allocation decisions on downstream areas. This can be 
attributed to that neither the environment nor downstream 
water users were represented in the judicial proceedings. Yet, 
every decision has downstream effects and this is confi rmed by 
the Abdul Rehman case that considers the issue from this view-
point. Both the lack of consideration of downstream users and 
the blanket imposition of an allocation benefi ting only down-
stream users are unfair and environmentally unsound. 
The basic point that arises in the Lake Rajsamand case is 
thus that there are multiple confl icts at different levels. An 
effective response requires looking at them comprehensively 
and addressing all the different issues concurrently.
The most glaring issue is the lack of focus on protecting the 
catchment area of Lake Rajsamand. Marble mining and its 
effects constitute the most signifi cant aspect of the local dis-
pute that was not fully taken into consideration in the judicial 
proceedings. This is not surprising for two reasons. First, the 
mining lobby is strong in the area and the main applicant in 
the judicial proceedings did not particularly emphasise the 
mining dimension to avoid “creating” additional confl icts that 
they would not have been able to address. Second, as indi-
cated, the high court did not seem to be ready to make direct 
links between mining and the water law. 
Moving beyond mining and the catchment area, various 
other confl icts should be addressed here. These include issues 
related to the allocation of surface water and groundwater, 
and the allocation of water in two separate watercourses, the 
Banas River and the Gomati River. This also includes the 
confl ict between the use of water in the upstream portion of 
the Banas River and the demands of downstream users for 
more water in the Bisalpur Dam. The limited example of the 
Lake Rajsamand case confi rms that such disputes must 
be addressed at multiple levels. It is as inappropriate for a 
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state-level agency to make blanket impositions that affect the 
whole state as it is for a local dispute to be decided without 
considering the broader downstream environmental and social 
impacts of water allocation. 
Conclusions
The regulation of inter-sectoral allocation of water is one of 
the major unaddressed challenges for water law. There is an 
urgent need that this issue be taken up more seriously. The 
Lake Rajsamand case provides an illustration of the limits of a 
legal framework that does not provide guidance for inter- 
sectoral allocation and for the basis of allocation decisions 
looking beyond the claims made by users. This is particularly 
damaging from the point of view of the environment and poor 
and underprivileged users.
This article has shown that confl icts concerning inter-
sectoral allocation centre around claims made by users for 
the available water. This fails to take into account the manner 
in which the water is made available, the factors that restrict 
its use, and the consequences of a certain allocation on 
downstream users. It is necessary to move beyond an under-
standing of water as a resource that is simply available for 
use without considering the upstream and downstream envi-
ronmental dimensions of such decisions, and the conse-
quences on users who are less (or not) represented in the 
balancing act. 
It is time to devise a framework that does not look at water 
as a natural resource to be allocated effi ciently but rather as 
one that regards it as a fundamental right to be allocated 
equitably, as a key component of the environment, and as the 
direct and indirect source of numerous livelihoods. This re-
quires situating existing legal principles at the centre of inter-
sectoral allocation to arrive at comprehensive, equitable and 
environment-friendly outcomes. 
Notes
1   For example, inter-sectoral water confl icts may 
also arise because different sources of water 
(such as surface water and groundwater) are 
governed by different sets of rules and over-
seen by different institutions even though they 
are hydrologically interlinked and infl uence 
each other.
2   The Ramgarh Dam, which was inaugurated in 
1903, used to be the major source of water for 
irrigation and drinking water for Jaipur 
District.
3  Personal communication with farmers during 
fi eld visits in May 2013 and August 2013.
4   Personal communication with Narendra Singh, 
National General Secretary, LAM.
5   Personal communication with Narendra Singh, 
National General Secretary, LAM.
6  Confi rmed in personal communications, for 
instance, with Ramji in Amloi and Nanda 
Khera in Batkera.
7  Interview with Dinesh Sharma, Assistant 
Engineer, Ajmer Vidhyut Vitaran Nigam.
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